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Working Misunderstandings: 
Donors, Brokers, and 
Villagers in Africa’s  
AIDS Industry
SuSan CottS WatkinS
ann SWidler
why do development projects, and aidS projects in particular, take the forms 
they do? in this essay we argue that it is because the conflicting interests and 
world views of the key actors involved—donors, brokers, and villagers—leave 
only a narrow range of themes and practices that can “work” on the ground. 
By “work” we do not mean, in the aidS case, that they help prevent Hiv 
transmission; indeed, the non-medical approaches to Hiv prevention are 
largely ineffectual. what needs to be explained is why such approaches are 
nonetheless repeated so consistently.1 we show that these themes and prac-
tices work in the sense that they satisfy the varied agendas of the major ac-
tors sufficiently to sustain their day-to-day cooperation. understanding these 
actors and their varying interests and world views is key to understanding 
why development projects rely on such a narrow repertoire of approaches, 
particularly the arcane and ubiquitous practice of training. Hiv prevention 
projects are our case in point.
Hiv prevention projects generate complex misunderstandings and con-
flicting motives among the critical actors in the aidS enterprise: the deep-
pocketed altruists who fund the programs, the local brokers who implement 
them, and the villagers who are the programs’ ultimate targets. much has 
been written about such misunderstandings and motives, both during the 
colonial period in africa (white 1987; Hodge 2007; Cooper 1998) and in re-
cent times (luke and watkins 2002; Gibson et al. 2005; Burchardt 2012; maes 
2012). the surprise in our story is the degree to which these disparate actors 
fumble toward accommodations that allow them to get along, however awk-
wardly. using an unusual range of data that we, our colleagues, and graduate 
students collected in malawi, we describe some of the cultural themes the 
aidS prevention and mitigation enterprise produces, and the remarkably 
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narrow set of concrete practices through which those themes are enacted. 
the case of “altruism from afar” thus illustrates the interaction of culture and 
practice in development aid, where interdependent actors cannot draw on a 
framework of common meanings and shared motives. 
although our focus is aidS, and particularly Hiv prevention and mitiga-
tion (rather than treatment, which has extended millions of lives), we should 
note that in many respects the global response to the aidS epidemic (which 
we term the aidS enterprise) is similar to its predecessor, the global popula-
tion movement (Cleland and watkins 2006). each addressed what was defined 
as an unprecedented emergency with global consequences. Solutions to both 
were understood to require fundamental changes in intimate behavior, changes 
that decoupled sex and birth in one, sex and death in the other. in both, the 
solutions were designed primarily for women, perceived to be vulnerable and 
powerless, rather than for men (Hodgson and watkins 1997; dodoo and Frost 
2008; Higgens, Hoffman, and dworkin 2010; Poulin and watkins 2012). the 
organizational machinery constructed in response to both emergencies was 
similar: a standardized choreography that mobilized huge resources, the cre-
ation of dedicated un agencies and functionally identical national coordinating 
commissions in developing countries, pressure on recalcitrant governments to 
take action, and blueprints for action (Putzel 2004; robinson 2011).
in both movements, the first efforts were to disseminate information and 
provide services (modern family planning, condoms), followed by a period of 
disappointment that the demand for services was inadequate. the slowness of 
behavioral response led to re-conceptualizing the problem in terms of steep 
barriers to change. although international actors in both movements identified 
poverty, gender inequity, and “traditional culture” as major barriers, in the case 
of Hiv prevention attention was also given to individual characteristics such as 
fatalism, denial, and stigma. the agents of the global actors also differed. Gov-
ernments were to do much of the managing of policies and programs to stem 
population growth, making use of what eventually became extensive networks 
of clinics to distribute modern contraception in the course of providing routine 
maternal and child health services. in contrast, nongovernmental organizations 
were assigned much of the work of Hiv prevention. the distinction is impor-
tant: while government institutions persist in situ, nGos come and go, and any 
structures they create, such as youth clubs to dramatize the dangers of aidS 
or microfinance projects to ameliorate poverty and empower women, usu-
ally evaporate when the project funding ends and the nGo departs (watkins, 
Swidler, and Hannan 2012). 
The AIDS enterprise
aidS in africa variously inspires empathy or at least sympathy (Kristof and 
wudun 2010; rothmyer 2011), or disillusionment (moyo 2009; easterly 
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2009). our reaction is different. rather than criticizing the massively funded 
organizations of the aidS enterprise for their failures or praising the efforts 
of the small-scale altruist who alights for a few weeks to assist a grandmother 
caring for aidS orphans, we have sought to describe, analyze, and interpret. 
in doing so, we highlight features of the enterprise that others have not com-
mented on.
Strikingly for a humanitarian endeavor, the organization of the aidS 
enterprise has much in common with the organization of an international 
capitalist firm: a head office in one country that outsources production and 
distribution to subcontractors in other countries (watkins, Swidler, and 
Hannan 2012; wallace et al. 2007; Cooley and ron 2002). in malawi, as in 
many other countries receiving foreign aid, the organizational field of in-
stitutionalized altruism is complex, chaotic, and frenetic. money often goes 
first to an international nongovernmental organization (inGo), which then 
subcontracts to either a branch office or a local nGo in the nation’s capital. 
Since these offices are still too distant from the intended beneficiaries, a chain 
of smaller subcontractors is constructed, until finally the donors reach an 
organization that interacts—or claims to interact—directly with the intended 
beneficiaries in the villages. at each level the nGo may engage “partners,” 
subcontracting specific programs to other nGos working on the same issue. 
thus, money flows chaotically both downward and sideways. and because 
projects are typically of short duration—and even then funding may be 
abruptly withdrawn—there are frenetic efforts to spend the money before it 
disappears, to increase what is called “the burn rate.”
in addition to institutional altruists, there are also swarms of freelance 
altruists. we met some of these on the plane flying to lilongwe, in the guest 
houses and small motels where we stayed, or walking around a market. Some 
were church groups; others were mom and Pop altruists, such as a Scottish 
couple who collected school materials during the year and then brought 
them to malawi in the summer; others were individuals, like a retired school 
teacher who had invented a better wheelbarrow, and a charlatan who was 
promoting his cure for aidS. 
the donors, large and small, have fantasies about what poor villagers 
need; the villagers too have their own fantasies and, like the brokers, their 
own aspirations. in malawi, where most villagers depend on subsistence 
agriculture, occasionally supplemented by small cash crops, any source of 
assistance is eagerly sought. testimony to the basically materialist orientation 
of the villagers is seen in the very terminology of the aid enterprise: the words 
“development” and “empowerment” have come to be understood as code 
words for material help, albeit help that usually remains tantalizingly out of 
reach. the newspapers regularly announce donations to the cause of Hiv pre-
vention and aidS mitigation: “Bush pledges $500m… to help fight Hiv/aids” 
(reuters 2002); “Canada grants K700 million for Hiv/aidS” (nyoni 2002); 
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unFPa, Blm launch K437m Youth Project” (times reporter 2006); “agro-
fund gives malawi uS $93m” (Sabola 2012); “Concern universal embarks on 
K640m project” (The Nation 2011). many rural villagers read these announce-
ments in the newspapers, but they can also see signs of donor wealth in the 
toyota 4x4s with nGo logos that speed along the roads, or foreign research 
projects that deposit interviewers and graduate students in villages year after 
year to gather what the villagers think must be valuable information. 
the primary way that donor money reaches the pockets of poor mala-
wians, however, is when an nGo trains volunteers to disseminate Hiv pre-
vention messages in the villages, to provide psychosocial support for orphans, 
or to promote better nutrition for people living with aidS. those who are 
selected for a “training” are considered lucky: stories circulate about a friend 
of a friend who received a per diem of 600 kwacha/day, plus accommodation 
and transportation. at the current exchange rate, a person who attended a 
three-day training would return home with nearly uS$6.00, in a country 
where annual per capita income is below uS $2002 (even less in the rural 
areas where 85 percent of the population lives). 
in our research we came to appreciate the roles of intermediaries: the 
cadres of relatively educated malawians who serve as brokers, translators, and 
fixers (lewis and mosse 2006). like Janus, the brokers look in one direction 
at the altruists who pay their salaries and in the other direction at the poor 
villagers the altruists seek to help. Just as there are layers of subcontractors, 
there are layers of brokers. the most educated and fortunate brokers staff the 
offices of the nGos in the capital, writing strategies, frameworks, log frames, 
work plans, and proposals for more funding and producing financial reports 
for donors; others—less well-networked—may staff a district office, running 
specific projects or conducting monitoring and evaluation for a project in their 
district. when the aim is both ambitious and vague, as it is when the donor 
aims to prevent Hiv by transforming villagers’ behavior through community 
mobilization, participation, and empowerment, there is a final step. the last 
mile to the villages is to be walked by volunteers who are trained by an nGo 
to deliver messages to their relatives, friends, and neighbors about the good-
ness of family planning or the badness of multiple sex partners. without the 
volunteers, donors cannot envision their projects as “sustainable” once the 
nGo inevitably decamps (Swidler and watkins 2009). without brokers, then, 
nothing that the altruists imagine will happen does happen.
despite all the attention to the altruists and their successes and failures, 
remarkably little attention has been given to the brokers,3 the actual individu-
als and organizations that provide the crucial link between the good deeds 
imagined by the altruists and their imagined recipients in the villages. these 
intermediaries, however, have complex aspirations and motivations of their 
own—some of them created by the aidS industry itself. 
as the aidS industry grew, participating nGos could offer opportunities 
for formal employment outside of government. this contributed to expanding 
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the middle class and enhancing the perceived value of education. in malawi 
there is now a clearly understood hierarchy of career possibilities based on 
educational credentials, from a volunteer in a small village community-based 
organization (CBo), appealing to youths with secondary education and no 
other hope for escaping village life, to a Ph.d. in a un agency in lilongwe with 
a salary large enough to provide first-world health care for his or her family 
and first-world education for his or her children. Brokers may also have other 
aspirations: to maintain their status in the local community, to manage the 
support of myriad relatives and other dependents, to cultivate local networks, 
to attain the next-higher educational credential. 
our account of the roles of local actors can be viewed as a narrative of 
seduction—and sometimes, of heartache and betrayal—characterizing the 
fraught embrace between altruists who come from afar and their significant 
others, the locals. Brokers all up and down the hierarchy play the role of 
“authentic african” for foreign visitors to embrace. For altruists, these direct 
experiences often shape beliefs about the real nature of africans and their 
problems. the educated cosmopolitans like to tell foreigners about the ex-
otic customs of the villagers, such as particular sexual behaviors or widow 
inheritance. recounting these “harmful cultural practices” (the typical term 
used by the elites) and telling stories about “foolish villagers” seem meant 
to accentuate the differences between the brokers and what they refer to as 
the “backward masses” and to solidify their credentials as valuable cultural 
insiders (englund 2006). 
the fraught relationship of brokers and donors, and of both to the vil-
lagers, is ironic, since the partners in these dalliances really want to get along; 
they want—and sometimes need—to make it work. nonetheless, their differ-
ent views of the world and of rural malawians, their differing experiences and 
constraints, and their sometimes conflicting interests and aspirations mean 
that they must fumble toward the themes and practices that can be made to 
work for everyone. 
Themes that make everyone happy
Fighting stigma
“Fighting stigma” is the mom-and-apple-pie of aidS interventions. everyone 
loves the idea. to western donors, the term signals a commitment to human 
rights, to fighting discrimination, and to an aggressive self-assertion by oth-
erwise despised groups, all responses to encounters with aidS in the west 
(Shilts 1987; epstein 1996; allen 2004). to malawians, its meaning is very 
different. Here, the message to fight stigma reinforces the normal obligation 
of reciprocity and interdependence among kin and neighbors. For villagers 
the message echoes their own understandings of the responsibility to care for 
those who are hungry or ill. 
202  A f r i c A ’ s  A iDs  i n D u s t r y
many donors sponsor programs to fight stigma, but the emphasis on 
compassion and care fits especially well with the mission of one set of do-
nors, the major religious denominations.4 local churches embrace the appeal 
to fight stigma because it gives them a way to be active in combating aidS 
without having to raise awkward issues about sex and condoms or hav-
ing to discuss openly what everyone knows: that the wealthier men in the 
congregation (and indeed the pastor as well) probably have outside sexual 
partnerships (Hunter 2010; Hirsch et al. 2009; Poulin and watkins 2012). it 
allows churches to maintain comity and fellowship among their members by 
advocating that people should “love each other,” should not blame or “isolate” 
each other, and should treat each other with kindness. 
the adjuration to be kind to those with aidS, to care for others, to take 
care of those who are ill, resonates with the importance villagers themselves 
place on taking care of the needy and maintaining harmonious relationships 
among neighbors. when we studied proposals written by villagers in 2005–06, 
requesting money from malawi’s national aidS Commission to fund Com-
munity Based organizations, many of the proposals—often those written in 
naïve language rather than the jargon villagers later mastered—claimed that 
the organization would “love” and care for those with aidS, as well as for 
the elderly or orphans, as indeed villagers had been doing since the epidemic 
began (Chimwaza and watkins 2004). For example, trinitapoli (2011), in a 
study of rural churches and mosques, found that pastors and sheikhs strongly 
advised against divorcing a spouse with aidS. the advice was not a matter of 
political correctness or human rights. rather the pastors and sheikhs felt that 
someone had to care for the person who was ill.5 
elizabeth Colson, an anthropologist who has worked for decades in 
Zambia, argues eloquently that africans do not need to be taught to fight 
stigma: “Somehow they have maintained a respect for their own moral in-
tegrity. many have shown abundant compassion, not just for the moment 
but over the long months of illness of those for whom they have accepted 
responsibility.… i would argue that they conceive of themselves as responsible 
human beings, meeting their obligations as best they can, and so maintain 
their own self respect” (Colson 2006: 124).
From a public health perspective, the persistence of calls to fight stigma is 
odd. we have found no rigorously designed studies that demonstrate empiri-
cally that reducing stigma reduces Hiv transmission. moreover, if the goal of 
Hiv prevention is behavior change, then persuading people not to condemn 
behaviors that lead to Hiv transmission could be counterproductive. Stigma 
nevertheless looms large in the imagined arsenal of aidS prevention inter-
ventions because it sounds good to all and offends no one: everyone, from 
donors and their sponsors, to brokers, to churches and villagers, can get on 
board. But even though donors, brokers, and villagers have all signed on to 
the same program, they “misunderstand” each other in the sense that the 
fight against stigma means something quite different to each group.
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Orphans and vulnerable children
the designation orphans and vulnerable Children (ovC) “works” for ev-
eryone in a different sense than stigma does. rather than legitimating an 
intervention, it defines a category of people to whom help may be legitimately 
directed.
For international organizations, the image of “orphans”—those bereft of 
both parents, alone in the world, facing desperate poverty and the emotional 
devastation of terrible loss—are the perfect poster children for attracting 
funding. For those living in circumstances where many children are poor, 
privileging orphans over other vulnerable children makes little sense.
For the donors’ purpose of stimulating compassion and charity in inter-
national audiences, real orphans—children who have lost both parents—are 
too small a category. orphanhood as a category was therefore expanded to 
cover loss of one parent as well as both. the resulting increase was substantial. 
Survey data from malawi records that 13.2 percent of children aged 0–17 in 
2004–06 were orphans by this wider definition. only 3.0 percent had lost both 
parents, a category now termed “double orphans” (Pullum 2008: 5).
reports on aidS orphans often acknowledge the enormous influence 
of the 1997 uSaid report Children on the Brink. its “breakthrough” was a new 
methodology for estimating both paternal and maternal, as well as double, 
orphans, creating high figures for the total number. the more capacious or-
phanhood definition allows international organizations to win the sympathy 
that the image of a parentless child evokes, while claiming very large numbers 
of children as in need of help and support. (a second Children on the Brink 
report was issued in 2000.)
the 1997 report estimated a total of 23 million orphans in 23 developing 
countries in 1996, and projected 35 million by the year 2000 and 40 million 
by 2010 (Hunter and williamson 2000). “the first comprehensive global es-
timates of orphans of Hiv and other causes, helped raise world awareness of 
the impending calamity of the Hiv/aidS pandemic in developing countries” 
(ibid.: 1).6 
expanding the orphanhood category did not, however, solve the prob-
lems of those with the task of distributing resources in the villages. world vi-
sion found that its child-sponsorship program created problems of inequality 
and envy in the villages: why should one poor child be favored over another 
just because that child was an orphan? (Bornstein 2003: 67, 95). the category 
was thus further expanded to take account of village understandings that it 
was not only orphans who were vulnerable children. as Chirwa (2002: 96) 
explains:
in most malawian languages the terms used to define an orphan and orphan-
hood include loss of parents; the rupture of social bonds; lack of family sup-
port; the process and situation of deprivation and want; and the lack of money 
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or means of livelihood. Some of these are, indeed, the effects of orphanhood. 
However, the malawian equivalents of orphanhood treat these as integral parts 
of the totality of the process of orphanhood. 
as a purely practical matter, local understandings determine the dis-
tribution of resources to village families. Since there are no records of the 
economic status of children in a village, and since interventions rarely begin 
with a survey that distinguishes between poor orphans and other poor chil-
dren, the village chief or a village committee is given the task of determining 
who deserves aid. For them, however, singling out those who happen to be 
orphans makes no sense. orphans are usually taken in by relatives—indeed 
often by the wealthier relatives in an extended kinship system—and thus may 
be better off economically than children who are still living with their biologi-
cal parents (ainsworth and Filmer 2002; republic of malawi and world Bank 
2007). the flexibility offered by the term orphans and vulnerable Children 
means that brokers working on the ground can fold child sponsorships into 
broader programs meant to help whole communities, as world vision does. 
they thus avoid creating envy, envy that may lead to accusations of witchcraft 
against those who are seen to benefit unjustly.
thus the capacious term orphans and vulnerable Children or ovC is 
not simply a random piece of organizational jargon. rather it represents a 
strategically calibrated, if unacknowledged, compromise among a number of 
agendas, meanings, and interests. like many other awkward neologisms and 
acronyms that litter the aidS landscape, the term also illustrates enormous 
cultural creativity as program beneficiaries and donors try to find an umbrella 
large enough to cover their multifarious needs, while retaining a symbol 
powerful enough to legitimate their activities. 
Vulnerable women
of all the themes that stimulate the imaginations of donors and brokers, one 
of the slipperiest is that of “vulnerable women.” Here, malawians and their 
international partners appear to be singing the same song: because of pov-
erty and culture, women are particularly vulnerable to Hiv infection, and as 
a result “something must be done.” But although the melody is the same, 
the lyrics are different. Both partners seem to identify the same problem, but 
each has a very different conception of what must be done. western donors 
imagine women as poor and weak, victims who urgently need empower-
ment so that they can “just say no” to unsafe sex and thereby turn the tide 
of the epidemic in sub-Saharan africa (uSaid 2002; european union 2005; 
watkins 2010).7 malawian brokers agree that women are “poor,” but they 
see mercenary women in miniskirts tempting good men: women who need 
to be reined in, rather than empowered.
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the disconnect is, we believe, a matter of perspective (tawfik and wat-
kins 2007). For international donors, women’s vulnerability has moved to 
the center of their understanding of the aidS epidemic, especially in africa 
(united nations 2001; Higgins, Hoffman, and dworkin 2010). From afar, 
western altruists see desperately poor women, without legal or social rights, 
engaging in survival sex to feed themselves and their starving children. mala-
wians, close to the epidemic, recognize that many women are poor and have 
few alternatives to depending on a sexual partner. But because in their view 
men cannot resist a woman who offers them sexual favors, what preoccupies 
malawian villagers—and elite brokers—is the personal threat posed by rapa-
cious women who take men’s money and give them, and thus their wives, 
a fatal disease. Both parties, international and national, believe that women 
are more likely to be infected than men: thus, the solutions they offer, while 
often appearing gender neutral, are not. 
rural malawians have come up with solutions to the problems posed 
by women. Some of these are on the international agenda, others are not. a 
council of town fathers, including “representatives of the district executive 
Committee, a representative of religious organizations, non Governmental 
organizations and female youth representative,” recommends abstinence 
and fidelity to counter the spread of aidS, but also restrictions to combat 
moral disorder: “3.3.5 to control the proliferation of pornographic materials” 
(Balaka district assembly 2000). other solutions are based on the assumption 
that when unrelated men and women are together at night, sex is inevitable; 
thus, there are recommendations to ban night meetings of religious groups 
and night dances after weddings. these solutions appear to be gender neutral. 
But villagers have also proposed ways that men can protect themselves that 
are not gender neutral: closing bars—where sex is sold—in the evenings, 
locking up sex workers, and disclosing the names of those found to be Hiv-
positive (the majority of whom they assume are women) so that others can 
avoid having sex with them. 
So how do elite nGo brokers, who see themselves as threatened by 
disorderly women but who also partake in the globalized discourse about 
vulnerable women, manage? one solution is to speak in different voices 
in different contexts. those who sit in a meeting making aidS policies and 
implementing programs do not speak of women in miniskirts seducing 
men. rather, they echo the language of the international community in 
attributing women’s and girls’ vulnerability to Hiv to poverty. But in our 
experience, when they leave the room where formal policy is being delib-
erated, they spontaneously talk of predatory sex workers and schoolgirl 
temptresses. From one room to another, the images of women shift shape. 
despite the rhetoric of women’s vulnerability, nGo brokers seek to restore 
moral order by suppressing vice, reducing temptation, and—especially—
restraining women’s behavior.
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Currently, proposed legislation in several african countries would 
subject anyone who knowingly infects another person with Hiv to criminal 
penalties (such legislation has been introduced in several high-Hiv-prevalence 
countries in the region). Further, malawi’s parliament is considering legisla-
tion for the mandatory testing of sex workers, domestic workers (typically 
female), and pregnant women. while human rights advocates oppose this 
legislation, the concept behind it—that those who know they are Hiv-positive 
but nonetheless have unprotected sex are willfully endangering others—
makes sense not only to villagers but also to elites. 
in response to the human rights advocates, elite brokers have adopted 
a clever solution to envelop the issue of controlling infected women in the 
rhetoric of human rights promoted by international organizations. in october 
2009, police in malawi arrested and forcibly tested sex workers, stimulating 
an outcry from human rights organizations. as reported in the newspapers, 
the official who had final responsibility for aidS policy, dr. mary Shawa, be-
gan by criticizing the police, but then, even as she invoked “human rights,” 
her view was transformed into a characterization of mercenary women who 
endanger their fellow citizens:
dr mary Shawa, Secretary for Hiv/aids and nutrition in the office of the 
President and Cabinet, said while malawi had to employ every available and 
legitimate way to contain Hiv/aids, testing the sex workers alone, and not their 
clients as well, was not justice enough. 
“we all know the importance of human rights. But when we are demanding our 
rights, we also have to keep in mind our responsibilities. it is the sex workers’ 
right to make money but if we are all careful, we will not make that money at 
the expense of another person’s right to life,” Shawa said. (mpaka 2009)
a high official of the malawi Human rights Commission, speaking of the 
need for mandatory testing of sex workers, put it more bluntly. He said, “it’s not 
easy to take a human rights lens to some of these issues. it’s like having a person 
with a machine gun with bullets. the bullets shoot out, bang! bang! bang! and 
many people are dead” [interview with watkins, 2009, authors’ files]. 
in the case of vulnerable women, then, the misunderstandings that 
separate the perceptions of malawian brokers (and villagers) from those 
of international donors are harder to bridge than in the cases of stigma or 
orphans. Here the “working misunderstandings” often don’t work, as local 
actors—both the district-level town fathers who want to ban pornography and 
forbid night gatherings where men and women might meet, and the national 
elites who wish to lock up sex workers—use the rhetorics of “empowerment” 
and human rights while continually returning to policies that would constrain 
rather than enhance women’s autonomy. 
in all three of these examples (and we could provide many more), gaps 
between expectations and understandings of different participants in the aidS 
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enterprise are finessed, side-stepped, or obscured. Categories and concepts 
are unstable in their meanings, and groups with very different agendas “get 
along” because they do not need to confront the different meanings they at-
tach to the same words. 
the fact that the actors who must get along to make Hiv prevention 
projects happen have such different interests and ideas nonetheless has real 
consequences. Because projects must meet the needs of donors, brokers, and 
villagers, there is a surprisingly narrow range of techniques used to conduct 
aidS prevention interventions in the field. the confusions created by the dif-
ferent meanings that villagers, brokers, and donors attach to the key themes 
of the enterprise are resolved only in the shared understanding that, whatever 
the theme, the dominant practice will be “training” (Smith 2003).
Practices that make everyone happy
in contrast to the malleability of categories and concepts are practices that 
seem set in stone. every aidS organization that seeks financial support from 
outside donors, even groups of church women caring for orphans or those 
living with aidS, has to adopt standardized practices. they have to learn 
how to write proposals, log frames, and work plans; to provide monitoring 
reports of their spending; and to evaluate their programs (dimaggio and 
Powell 1983). every CBo in malawi has a standard array of committees cor-
responding to donor themes (ovC, Home Based Care, Plwa [Persons living 
with aidS], Youth), each with an executive committee, and all must submit 
regular reports to their funder.8 “there is an untheorized consensus on what 
an Hiv/aidS programme should look like: it should be founded on voluntary 
counseling and testing, education (preferably by peers), provision of condoms, 
efforts to overcome denial, stigma and discrimination, and care and treatment 
for people living with Hiv and aidS.… even when undertaken by a govern-
ment ministry, army, or private company, it is essentially an nGo model of 
public action” (de waal 2003: 254). 
Training
the most pervasive, most standardized, and to an outside observer the most 
arcane in its detailed choreography is the practice of “training.” trainings have 
become the ubiquitous social practice through which development aspirations 
are enacted jointly by donors, brokers, and villagers fortunate enough to be 
included in a training. whatever donors might imagine is being done with the 
money they allocate to prevent Hiv, to improve agriculture or nutrition, to 
initiate early childhood education projects, or, now, to combat climate change, 
the recipients—and villagers at large—know that one specific requirement 
is training. we have seen it in the hundreds of budgets submitted by CBos 
seeking funding from malawi’s national aidS Commission (naC), but also 
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in the myriad trainings we have observed at rural motels and city conference 
centers, sponsored by the world Bank, uSaid, the norwegian agency for 
development, and many other donors. Some trainings impart substantive 
information, as clinical officers are trained in a new procedure for resuscitat-
ing infants. others, with goals like creating “aidS competent communities” 
or making communities “resilient to the impacts of climate change,” seem 
unlikely to have any impact at all. a undP project to “mainstream gender” 
was implemented by training “gender focal persons” (often the lowest women 
on the professional ladder) in government ministries. agricultural extension 
agents are trained in how to train farmers how to cook nsima (the staple food, 
which even men know how to cook) and other local foods. villagers are 
trained to be volunteers, spreading the word about how to care for the sick 
and elderly, or how to prevent Hiv transmission, or how to empower women 
by changing the norms that make women vulnerable. 
all of the trainings are constituted by a ritualized set of practices. Just as 
a Catholic mass would not be a mass without wine and wafers, a training is 
not a “training” without allowances for attending the training, flip charts and 
magic markers, a “bun” and a “Fanta” at mid-morning and mid-afternoon 
breaks, and an ample lunch. not only are the equipment and the food ritual-
ized, the activities are ritualized as well. the better-educated facilitator speaks 
of familiar concepts and practices in new terminology (“decision making,” 
“multiple and concurrent partners”). Forms of participation are stereotyped, 
as when participants break into small groups, with each group taking a large 
sheet from the flip chart to write down ideas supporting the trainings’ theme, 
and then reassemble to share the products of their efforts. other activities 
seem more peculiar to an outside observer: hymn singing, jumping around 
playing children’s games, skits and songs. But donors and the many layers of 
brokers have become convinced that whatever the problem, training is the 
solution.
in 2005, we studied a naC program aimed at mobilizing community 
groups to address the causes and impacts of the aidS epidemic. existing 
community groups, such as members of a church group that visited the sick 
or cared for orphans, were invited to turn themselves into CBos with a com-
mittee and a bank account, and then write proposals to the naC to support 
their activities. others, hearing of the funding opportunities, created a CBo 
de novo. we reviewed the proposals submitted through the district office of 
one of the international nGos that had been hired by the naC to manage the 
proposal process. the proposals from village groups were poignant in what 
they asked for and in their attempts to put what they really wanted—material 
resources—in terms that naC might agree to fund (Swidler and watkins 
2009). early in the process, proposals would ask for resources to feed the sick 
and the elderly, but these were likely to be turned down as “not sustainable” 
or “not compatible with nSF [the national Strategic Framework of the naC],” 
a document not available in the villages. 
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By the time we reexamined the process in 2008, again looking at both 
accepted and rejected proposals, much in the process had changed as commu-
nities learned what would be funded: a lot of trainings and a small amount of 
resources. the nsamanyada CBo proposed nine activities, each with a train-
ing and a budget. the list of activities begins with training for HBC [Home 
Based Care], which also includes a small amount for panadol and bandaids 
for the HBC kit. next was the Hiv/aidS Support Group training for “Positive 
living” and for “nutritious training,” along with an “awareness Campaign.” 
in addition to the standard list of necessary items without which a training 
would not be legitimate (the flip chart, pens, buns and Fantas), the budget 
included a modest expenditure for “procurement of other nutritious food, 
cooking oil and sugar.” third is “elderly and disabled training,” followed by 
“Child Protection training,” and then “Youth Peer education training,” and 
training in care for ovC. then there is “Business management training,” 
again with the usual apparatus and a modest amount to support an income-
generating project: the group proposed to earn income by raising pigs, and 
requested funding to build a pen, purchase three pigs, and buy feed and drugs 
for the pigs. But this, of course, requires “Piggery training,” which turns out 
to be considerably more expensive than buying the three pigs or even feed-
ing them. the grand total in the nsamanyada CBo’s budget proposal came 
to 1,500,000 Kwacha (about $11,000 at the 2008 exchange rate). of this 
budget, 1,478,040 Kwacha was for the multiple, carefully elaborated varieties 
of “training.” [document in authors’ files]
in the proposals, the budgets are detailed but the content of the trainings 
is not. nor do they need to be: what matters to the proposers as well as to 
naC’s budget is the number of people who will benefit by receiving allow-
ances, the number of days of training, and the amount of the allowances. in 
2008 the interfaith Helpers ministry submitted a proposal to train 144 people 
in nine villages: “44 female church leaders; 60 male church leaders; 37 youth 
leaders; and 3 traditional leaders [chiefs].” the actual activities budgeted 
were: “Sensitization meetings on legal, ethical, and social rights of the Plwa 
and the affected people” and “training of key social groups in Hiv/aidS man-
agement.” the project was to culminate in a “social mobilization campaign 
on gender/human rights and cultural values” for which five members of a 
drama group and five facilitators of the trainings were to be paid allowances 
for four days. [document in authors’ files.]
what goes on in a training? we have observed trainings of youth peer 
educators, volunteers who are to fan out to the villages to teach others what 
they have learned. the trainings are led by a facilitator (sometimes two) who 
follows a manual. like teachers, they stand in front of the seated trainees, 
lecturing, pointing to the blackboard, and asking questions with known an-
swers (Kendall 2004). when participants are asked to demonstrate what they 
have learned, they replicate this performance: lecturing, pointing to words 
on a flip chart, asking questions.9 
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the structure of a training, which donors might imagine as an equal-
izing activity, in fact mirrors local understandings of the social hierarchy. 
the more educated enlighten the less educated, who defer to their expertise. 
village chiefs and other participants of higher status, such as a schoolteacher 
or a pastor, are budgeted for a larger per diem and a more expensive lunch 
than ordinary villagers, and are served first. Such distinctions of influence 
and status are respected all the way down the line. 
why does the training as a social form have such an amazing hold? we 
think that trainings satisfy the practical needs of the participants, of the bro-
kers, and of the donors, but also provide meanings that satisfy the fantasies 
of each group. 
who benefits from the trainings? For the poorest participants—the vil-
lagers who volunteer their services to mobilize their community for one nGo 
goal or another—per diems are a financial windfall (currently a day’s allow-
ance for a training of rural volunteers in malawi is about uS$1.90). although 
this is not the only way that participants benefit from trainings, it seems to be 
the most important. villagers with some education but no job might attend a 
training with little direct remuneration—perhaps only a lunch or a snack—
because volunteering is seen as a route to the possibility, however remote, of 
eventual employment (Swidler and watkins 2009). 
trainings are also important for brokers who have a government or an 
nGo salary. the amount of broker per diems is such a contentious issue that it 
is likely that without any financial benefit no one with a regular salary would 
attend a training, even one related to the broker’s duties. an evaluation of a 
uSaid project to improve maternal and child health by training staff reported 
that “there has [sic] been persistent problems with the allowances awarded to 
the dHo [district Health office] staff, which has prevented or slowed down 
many project activities. many moHP [ministry of Health and Population] 
staff refuse to conduct activities with the level of allowances approved by 
uSaid…” (uSaid 2003; see also vian et al. 2012). trainings can also serve 
in lieu of salaries: a skilled technician working at a government hospital as a 
volunteer because there were no openings on the staff was assigned by his 
boss to attend successive trainings on anemia and on prevention of mother-
to-child transmission—both outside his area of expertise—indeed on anything 
that might offer him even a modest amount of support. [interview 2010] this 
fits well with a patron–client economy: the boss becomes a patron who will 
expect something, sometime, in return, and the counselor becomes a client, 
in debt to his patron (Smith 2003).
For donors, the trainings of village volunteers to teach others are the 
only practical way that they can imagine transforming the billions of poor 
people into participating, self-actualizing, empowered individuals. equally 
important, the training satisfies the donor fantasy that the interventions are 
sustainable—knowledge is transmitted, participants sensitized—without re-
quiring recurrent expenditures. lastly, for both donors and brokers, trainings 
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have another practical advantage: the number of people trained provides an 
easy measure of success to report to funders, at least as long as donors and 
their funders have faith in the power of training to transform the identities 
and behaviors of poor villagers.
training also benefits donors and high-level brokers in another, less 
obvious way. Because training is so flexible (anyone can be trained about 
almost anything) and so easy to arrange (partly because the conventions 
are so well understood), trainings can be used as “walking around money” 
through which a program’s sponsors can create broad political support for 
their programs among various “stakeholders” and others whose good will may 
be useful. to build support for aidS programs, for example, malawi’s national 
aidS Commission allocated funding to virtually every government ministry 
for “mainstreaming” aidS, in effect spreading the aidS largesse around in 
the form of training (with allowances and per diems) in Hiv/aidS. 
trainings, however peculiar they may seem, are not some arcane donor 
invention foisted on resistant locals. at all levels brokers as well as village 
volunteers embrace, even demand, them.10 the appeal of training lies not just 
in the material rewards, but in the mystique of its games and songs and its 
hours of scripted minutiae. adults play children’s games or sit on the ground 
drawing root-and-branch diagrams to discover the that “root” of a particular 
problem is, in the well-recognized conventions of the training, precisely the 
thing the training is meant to combat: whether aidS, malnutrition, illiteracy, 
or infant mortality. Participants listen attentively as facilitators rehearse jargon 
and pose rhetorical questions, adding their own suggestions to the inevitable 
lists of “next steps” or recite problems for the “problem tree.” all this activity 
helps donors believe they are doing something about problems they define as 
urgent, even if the problems themselves are hardly likely to be solved through 
training. elite brokers go to trainings, although these are called “workshops,” 
which signals the status of the attendees. these help elite brokers keep abreast 
of the latest donor concerns, distinguishing those who know the current 
importance of climate change, or the role of “multiple concurrent partner-
ships” in the spread of Hiv, from those who are not as up-to-date. But even 
the aspiring local brokers—those whom we have called “interstitial elites” 
because they link the world of the village to the larger cosmopolitan world 
outside (Swidler and watkins 2009)—eagerly seek the sense of identity and 
of connection to authoritative global knowledge (Frank and meyer 2007) 
that trainings provide.
trainings are thus the quintessential example of a practice that “works” 
because it satisfies the multiple agendas of different actors, even when the 
concepts and meanings they bring to it may be very different. there are 
other such practices: the pervasive evaluations that produce mainly “success 
stories” and lists of “challenges” calling for more resources; the “monitoring” 
that carefully enumerates the number of members in youth drama clubs that 
circulate from one village or secondary school to another, performing aidS 
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dramas for students who in their turn perform aidS dramas for others; or 
the precise number of people “reached” at an outdoor aidS day celebration 
featuring a band, comedians, and skits (1,410 men, 1,634 women, 1,940 boys, 
2,010 girls) (Balaka acting district aidS Coordinator 2010). these activities 
share a similar property of providing satisfaction for actors up and down the 
aid chain without forcing them to confront the contradictions in their goals, 
aspirations, or understandings.
Conclusions
By focusing attention on the cultural themes and practices that dominate the 
aidS prevention enterprise, we have emphasized the generative power of the 
conflicting motives, aspirations, and understandings of the central actors in 
such efforts in poor countries. like family planning before it, aidS preven-
tion has generated layers of local brokers who mediate between international 
donors and the poor villagers whose lives are seen as requiring transformation. 
rather than simply being critical of the self-delusion of some donors, or the 
mercenary motives of some brokers and villagers, we have emphasized that in 
trying to get along, to find ways of making their shared enterprise work, these 
actors have, without taking conscious account of it, generated new themes and 
practices that flourish because at one level or another they “work” for every-
one involved. Combating stigma may not be an effective way to reduce Hiv 
transmission; focusing on orphans and vulnerable Children may not target 
the parentless children the altruists imagine; efforts to empower vulnerable 
women may be foiled by africans’ views that women are more perpetrators 
than victims of the aidS threat. But these focal points of the aidS enterprise 
have nonetheless created new realities on the ground in africa. training, as 
we have sought to show, is even more thoroughly institutionalized. as marian 
Burchardt (2012) has noted of institutions of aidS governance in faith-based 
organizations in South africa, “the resulting assemblage of people, resources, 
and opportunities is not some form of halfway modernization or uneasy con-
nection of two pure forms but a form of practice in its own right.”
our argument suggests that even mismatched fantasies can create new 
realities as people attempt to enact their ideals and aspirations. like a pas-
sionate love affair that eventually settles into a reasonably satisfying marriage, 
imagination can animate the creation of real partnerships. each party com-
promises; neither ends up in the situation he or she originally imagined; but 
their mutual accommodations and compromises create new possibilities.
How then should we evaluate the influence of the aidS industry in 
africa? if we ask whether these organizations have succeeded in doing what 
they set out to do, the answer is no; the record of Hiv-prevention nGos 
is largely one of failure (watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012; Potts et al. 
2008). But if we take a broader perspective, we find that aidS altruism has 
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changed the landscape in fundamental ways. there are new understandings 
of possible careers; new cultural themes to be mastered; and the adaptation 
and multiplication of imported social structures, such that no one is far re-
moved from a professionalized Community Based organization or from an 
indigenous group of church members that has transformed itself into a Faith 
Based organization.
it is possible, as Cleland and watkins (2006) argued for the family 
planning movement, that even without transforming poor rural villagers’ 
identities and turning them into more self-actualized, empowered actors, the 
programs and projects of international donors may, over a longer time, have 
at least some of their intended effects. the terminology of “gender” is already 
becoming domesticated (merry 2006), sometimes incorporated into the flir-
tatious repartee that characterizes interactions between women and men in 
rural malawi. the aidS epidemic itself has also stimulated the formulation of 
new strategies in local social networks, such as limiting the number of sexual 
partners, choosing partners more carefully to avoid infection, or divorcing 
a high-risk spouse, strategies that in principle could reduce the force of the 
epidemic (watkins 2004).
in the study of institutional forms, scholars recognize that institutional 
capacities created for one purpose may be animated by new purposes and 
may come to serve new interests (Skocpol and Feingold 1982; Hall and taylor 
1996; thelen 2004; mahoney and thelen 2010). Such a process appears to 
be happening, for example, with the CBos and FBos, structures meant to 
replicate traditional forms of village self-help, but largely invented as formal 
organizations in response to the flood of funding for aidS prevention and 
mitigation. But precisely because these organizations could be integrated with 
existing patterns of patron–client ties, because they served both the status 
aspirations and to some degree the material interests of at least some local 
populations, they have become increasingly an institutionalized fixture of ma-
lawi’s rural landscape. Currently these organizations exist largely to apply for 
outside donor funding, rationalizing at least one small corner of the enterprise 
of altruism. But when structures are created, no one can fully anticipate what 
these new capacities may be used for. Possibilities range from new avenues for 
political mobilization to increased penetration of global governance directly 
into village life, bypassing national states.
there is one other unanticipated consequence of the aidS enterprise. 
the new opportunities that the donor-driven economies have created depend 
crucially on the acquisition of an array of minutely stratified educational cre-
dentials. donors have thus given substance, however fragile and elusive, to 
malawians’ passionate belief that education is the route to a “bright future” 
(Frye 2012). this reshaping of identities and aspirations may ultimately be 
the most lasting legacy of the struggle against aidS. in one of the ironies of 
complex human enterprises, this reshaping in turn becomes a major impe-
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tus to the fulfillment of another donor fantasy: persuading the poor to want 
fewer children. 
as the aidS enterprise, and the nGo presence more generally, have 
opened up career paths that appear to depend on educational credentials, 
even poor parents may start to see focusing their resources on fewer children 
as crucial for their own futures and those of their children. it may be precisely 
nGo practices like training, which so resemble school, which require moder-
ate literacy but no high-level technical skills, and which reward achievement 
even in a woefully out-of-date school curriculum such as malawi’s, that could 
motivate parents—who have long resisted the blandishments of the family 
planning nGos—finally to limit fertility. 
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1 Few Hiv prevention interventions 
are designed to permit rigorous evaluation; 
if there is an evaluation, it typically consists 
of collecting anecdotes—success stories and 
testimonials—from the people who imple-
mented the intervention and from those who 
were meant to benefit from it (watkins, 
Swidler, and Hannan 2012). a recent compre-
hensive review of Hiv prevention activities 
found that when the study design is rigorous, 
that is, a randomized controlled trial with 
biomarker outcomes rather than self-reports 
on a survey, the only effective interventions 
were biomedical. the seven behavior change 
randomized controlled trials with biomarker 
outcomes had no significant effects (Padian et 
al. 2010; see also Potts et al. 2008).
2 the purchasing power parity estimate 
is higher, $834 per person per year. Cash 
income remains hard to come by for most vil-
lagers, so even the tiny allowances for meals 
and transport are extraordinarily valuable.
3 exemplary exceptions are anders 2006; 
merry 2006; mosse and lewis 2005; olivier 
de Sardan 2006; temudo 2005). For histori-
cal accounts of brokers in colonial africa, see 
Cooper 1998 and Hodge 2007. 
4 “Preaching wednesday to more than 
3,000 people in a stadium in the mining town 
of Kitwe, archbishop of Canterbury rowan 
williams called on Christians not to abandon 
people living with Hiv/aidS. ‘the church 
should deal with Hiv and aidS. the church 
in africa deals with Hiv and aidS, and we 
should not forget or forsake those that have 
the disease,’ williams said in his address, 
which was broadcast live on community radio 
stations. ‘we are sent to share the suffering 
and joys with our neighbors; we are sent to be 
alongside them and listening to their needs. 
we should give our lives to others, as Jesus 
did’” (agence France Presse 2011).
5 trinitapoli (2011) writes: “the primary 
reason given [by pastors and sheikhs] for op-
posing aidS-related divorce is the mandate 
to care for the sick. if an adulterous spouse 
is caught ‘red-handed,’ one can divorce, as 
a matter of self-protection; but if a spouse is 
known to be Hiv+ (through an Hiv test or ob-
vious symptoms), one must not divorce. one 
leader who strongly and emphatically opposed 
divorce under suspicion of aidS emphasized 
the wife’s role to care for her husband: ‘no! it 
is not appropriate! who are you going to leave 
him with? who would take care of him?’”
6 the report analyzed data from 34 “de-
veloping countries,” mostly in africa, but also 
including several in latin america and asia. 
it constantly merges the idea of orphans in 
general and aidS orphans. the 1997 report 
covered 23 countries; the 2000 report added 
11 more, mostly in sub-Saharan africa, for a 
total of 34.
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